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In thispaperweexamine the effectiveness in controlling
long-run inflation offeedback rules for monetary policy
that link changes in a short-term interest rate to an
intermediate target for either nominal GDP or M2. We
concludethata ruleaimedatcontrolling thegrowth rateof
nominalGDP with an interest rate instrument could be an
improvement over a purely discretionary policy. Our re-
sults suggest that the rule could provide better long-run
controlofinflation without increasing the volatility ofreal
GDP or interest rates. Moreover, such a rule couldassist
policymakers even if it were used only as an important
source ofinformation to guide a discretionary approach.
*An earlier version of this paper (Judd and Motley 1992) will be
published under the same title in a forthcoming issue of Finance and
Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
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In Congressional testimony, Chairman Greenspan and
other Federal Reserveofficials havemade itclear that price
stability is the long-run goal of U.S. monetary policy! At
the same time, reducing fluctuations in real economic
activity and employment remains an important short-term
goal of the System. However,the desire to mitigate short-
term downturns inevitably raises the issue of whether this
goal should take precedence over price stability at any
particular point in time. At present, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FaMe) resolves this issue on a case
by case basis, using its discretion to set policy after
analysis of a wide array of real and financial indicators
covering the domestic and international economies.
Economic theory suggests that monetary policy tends to
have an inflationary bias under such a discretionary sys-
tem. This bias can be eliminatedbythe monetary authority
pre-committing itself to a policy rule that would ensure
price stability in the long run (Barro 1986). Even if the
monetary authority is not willing to adhere rigidly to arule,
a discretionary approach could benefit from the informa-
tion provided bya properly designed rule. Forexample, the
instrumentsettings defined bytherule at any time could be
regarded asthe baseline policy alternative that would serve
as the starting point for policy discussions. At its discre-
tion, the FOMC could select a policy that was easier,
tighter or about the same as that called for by the policy
rule. Under such an approach, the rule could provide
information that would help to guide short-run policy
decisions toward those consistent with the long-run goal of
price stability.
In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of so-called
nominal feedback rules of the type suggested by Bennett
McCallum (l988a, 1988b). These rules specify how a
policy instrument(avariablethat is underthedirect control
of the central bank) responds to deviations of anintermedi-
ate target variable from pre-established values. Earlier
work (Judd and Motley 1991)suggests that a rule in which
the monetary base is used as the instrument and nominal
lSee Greenspan (1989)and Parry(1990).
3GDP is used as the intermediate target could have pro-
duced price level stability with a high degree of certainty
over the past 30 years.
Over many years, the Fed has shown a strongpreference
for conducting policy using an interest rate instrument, as
opposed to a reserves or monetary base instrument. In the
present paper, we examine rules that use an interest rate
instrument in conjunction with nominal GDP as the inter-
mediate target. In addition, since the mid-1980s, the Fed
has used a broad monetary aggregate, M2, as its main
intermediate target or indicator. Hence, we also assess the
usefulness of a rule that combines an interest rate instru-
ment with M2 as the intermediate target variable.
Evaluating the effects of policy rules in advance of
actually using them is an inherently perilous task. First,
the effects of a rule will depend on the structure ofthe
economy,including severalfeatures-suchasthedegree of
price flexibility and the way in which expectations are
formed-thatremain subjects of debate and disagreement
among macroeconomists (Mankiw 1990). This lack of
consensus about issues that crucially affect the working
of the economy means that, in order to be credible, any
proposed rule must be demonstrated towork well within
more than one theoretical paradigm. Second, implementa-
tion of a rule could alter key behavioral parameters affect-
ing price setting and expectations formation. This means
thathistory may notbe agood guide inevaluatingrules that
were not implemented in the past, and that the robustness
of empirical results to alternative parameter values also
must be examined.
In order to assess their effectiveness under alternative
macroeconomic paradigms, we conduct simulations of
two different macroeconomic models (a Keynesian model
and an atheoretic vector autoregression or error correction
system) that have significant followings among macro-
economists. 2 Toassess therisks ofadoptingdifferentrules,
we examine the dynamic stability of these models under
alternative versions of the rules. In addition, we use
stochastic simulations to determine the range of outcomes
for prices, real GDP and a short-term interest rate that we
could expect if these rules were implemented and the
economyexperienced shocks similar in magnitude tothose
inthepast. Finally,totest forrobustness, were-examine all
of the results under plausible alternative values for key
estimated parameters in the models.
-Our earlier paper (Judd and Motley 1991), in which the policy instru-
ment was the monetary base, also examined the effects of a rule within
the contextof a very simple real business cycle(RBC) model. However,
with an interest rate instrument, the price level cannotbe determined in
the context of thatRBC model (see McCallum 1988b, pp. 61-66). Thus
we did not use the RBC model in this paper.
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Using these simulations we evaluate the effectiveness of
the rules at controlling the price level. Wealso examine the
effect of the rules on the volatility of real GDP and a short-
term interest rate. Although we find that interest rate rules
could have held long-run inflation below levels that were
observed historically, they do not perform as well as base-
oriented rules. However, there are reasons to believe that
the base would be a less effective instrument in the future
than it would havebeen in the past. Moreover, one simple
form of the interest rate rule does appear to offer an
improvement over a purely discretionary approach. fi-
nally, we suggest a way to use a feedback rule with an
interestrate instrument as an important source of informa-
tion that could contribute to the effectiveness of a discre-
tionary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section I presents a brief overview of the theoretical
advantages and disadvantages of alternative targets and
instruments. Section II discusses the nominal feedback
rules to be tested. In Section III, we present the empirical
results. The conclusions we draw from this work are
presented in Section IV.
I. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
In this section, we discuss briefly the basic conceptual
issues determining the effectiveness of alternative inter-
mediate targets and instruments of monetary policy. To
illustrate certain basic ideas, we introduce a generic form
of the feedback rule that links the instrumentvariable with
the intermediate target variable. This generic feedback
rule may be written in the form:
ti.I, = l/; + A.[ZI~I - ZI_a·
The variable I represents the policyinstrument, which is a
variable under the direct control of the monetary authority.
Z representsthe intermediate target variable of policy.The
rule specifies that the change in the policy instrument
should be equal to the change desired in steady-state
equilibrium, 1jJ, plus an adjustmentterm, A[ZT-l - ZI_I]'
This latter term describes the monetary authority's re-
sponse to deviations between the actual level of the inter-
mediate target variable (Z) and its desired level (Z*). The
strength of the monetary authority's response to such
deviations is defined by A. Thus, the rule permits policy to
incorporate varying degrees of aggressiveness in pursuing
the intermediate target.
The policy instrument, I, responds only to lagged, and
hence observed, valuesoftheintermediatetargetZ. Hence,
the rule can be implemented without reference to any par-
ticular model. This is an advantage in view of the current
disagreement about the "correct" model of the economy.
Economic Review/ 1992, Number 3Nominal feedback rules may gain wider appeal because it
may be possible to agree about the effectiveness of a
particular rule, while disagreeing about certain aspects of
how the economy actually works.
AlternativeIntermediate Targets
The appeal of nominal GDP as an intermediate target
lies in the apparent simplicity of its relationship with the
pricelevel, which isthe ultimate long-term goal variableof
monetary policy (Hall 1983). As shown by the following
identity, the price level (P) is equal to the difference
between nominal GDP (x) and real GDP (y), where all
variables are in logarithms:
p = x - y.
This identity means that there will be a predictable long-
termrelationship between nominal GDP and the pricelevel
as long as the levelof steady state real GDP is predictable.
According to someeconomists, thelevelofreal GDPhas
a long-run trend, called potential GDP, which is deter-
minedbyslowlyevolvinglong-run supplyconditions in the
economy,including trends in the labor forceand productiv-
ity (Evans 1989). To the extent that this view is correct, it
is straightforward to calculate the path of nominal GDP
required to achieve long-run price stability.
However,other research suggests thatreal GDP doesnot
follow a predictable long-run trend, and is stationary only
in differences (King, Plosser, Stock and Watson 1991). If
this were the case and nominal GDP were to grow at a
constant rate under a rule, the price level would evolveas
a random walk, and thus could drift over time. Unfor-
tunately, statistical tests are not capable of distinguishing
reliably between random walks and trend stationary pro-
cesses with autoregressive roots close to unity (Rudebusch
1993). This uncertaintyover the long-run behavior of real
GDP means that there is corresponding uncertainty over
how the price level would behave under a nominal GDP
target.3
Another potential problem is that the lags from policy
3In part because ofthis concern, a number of authors have argued that
the Federal Reserve should target prices directly (Barro 1986, and
Meltzer1984).Nomatter what time series properties real GDP displays,
direct price level targeting obviously could avoid long-term price-level
drift. The major disadvantage of price level targeting is that in sticky
price models, the feedback between changes in the instrument and the
price level is very long (and, in fact, longer than for nominal GDP).
Thus, attempts by monetary policy to achieve a predetermined path for
prices are liable to involveinstrument instability (i.e., explosivepaths
for the policy instrument) and undesirably sharp movements in real
GDP. Our earlier empirical results (Judd and Motley 1991)confirmthis
conjecture.
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actions to nominal GDP are relatively long, and thus
targeting nominal GDP might induce instrument instabil-
ity. Shorter lags tend to exist between policy actions and
monetary aggregates. Hence, using an aggregate as an
intermediate target could reduce the likelihood of produc-
ing instrument instability compared to a nominal GDP
target.
Since the velocity of M1began to shift unpredictably in
the early 1980s, M2 has been the main intermediate target
used by the Fed and so is a prime candidate for use in a
feedback rule. M2 also has been identified as a potential
intermediate target because its velocity (in levels)has been
stationary over the past three decades (Miller 1991, Hall-
man, Porter and Small 1991). Its short-run relationship
with spending, however, has not been very reliable. These
problems have intensified in recent years, with accumulat-
ing evidence of instability in M2 velocity in 1990-1992
(Judd and Trehan 1992, Furlong and Judd 1991). Nonethe-
less, it may be possible to exploit its long-run relationship
with prices to achieve price stability.
For present purposes, the important implication of the
preceding discussion is that the choice of an intermediate
target variable cannot be determined from theory alone.
This choice depends on empirical factors such as the time
series properties of real GDP, the degree of flexibility of
prices, and the predictability of the velocity of money.
Clearly an empirical investigation is needed.
Alternative Instruments
Instruments of monetary policy fall into two basic
categories: aggregates that are components of the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet, such as the monetary base or the
stock of bank reserves, and short-term interest rates, such
as the federal funds rate. Either category qualifies as a
potential instrument since either can be controlled pre-
cisely in the short run by the central bank and each is
causally linked to output and prices.
The monetary base has the advantage that, in principle,
it is the. variable that determines the aggregate level of
prices, and thus would appear to be a natural instrumentto
usein arule designed to achieveprice stability.However,it
has a number of potential disadvantages. First, using the
base as an instrument could cause interest rates to become
excessively volatile, and thereby impair the efficiency of
financial markets. Second, the base is made up mainly
of currency in the hands of the public (currently, about
85 percent), and concern for efficiency in the payments
system argues for supplying all the currency the public
demands. This means that controlling the base requires
operating on a small component of it (bank reserves).
Hence, relatively small changes in the base might require
5large proportional changes in reserves, which could dis-
rupt the reserves market. Third, along with M1, the de-
mand for the base has become relatively unstable in the
1980s compared with prior decades. The deregulation of
deposit interest rates and increased foreign demand for
U.S. currency apparently have induced permanent level
shifts in the demand for the base, and possibly a change in
its steady-state growth rate.
In Judd and Motley (1992, Appendix C) weexamine the
stability of the demand for base money and the issue of
whether the need to supply currency on demand would
seriously inhibitthe use of the base as a policy instrument.
We conclude that although these problems are legitimate
reasons for concern whether a base rule would work well,
theyprobably are notfatal. Nonetheless, itis worthwhileto
explore the possibility of using a short-term interest rate as
the instrument in the context of the feedback rule since the
FOMC has shown a preference over the years for using the
federal funds rate as its instrument. 4 This is our main
purpose in this paper.
It is well-known that an interest rate would not be a
satisfactory intermediate target for policy. The economy
would be dynamically unstable in the long run (i.e., the
price level would be indeterminate) if nominal interest
rates were held steady at a particular level and not permit-
ted to vary flexibly in response to shocks. However, this
argument does not rule out its use as an instrument.
Ifinterestrate movements are linked to changes in a nom-
inal variable (such as nominal GOP,amonetary aggregate,
or the price level itself) through a rule, the price level
may be determinate (McCallum 1981). Thus the question
of whether an interest rate instrument would function
effectively within a feedback rule cannot be answered by
theory alone. Empirical work is required.
II. NOMINAL FEEDBACK RULES
We examine two rules in which the interest rate is used
as the instrument and one that uses the monetary base. We
use the following symbols throughout: b = log of the
monetary base, R = the three-month Treasury bill rate,
m2 = logofthe broad monetary aggregate, M2, x = logof
nominal GOP,yf = log offull-employmentreal GOP, and
"*" denotes a value desired by the central bank.
Equation 1 employs nominal GOP as the intermediate
target and the interest rate as the instrument.
4Apparently, this preference is based in part on the view that this
approach avoidsimparting unnecessary volatility to financial markets
that would arise if policy were conducted using a reserves or monetary
base instrument.
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(1) M t = -A.I[X;"_I - Xt-I] + A.2[X;" _ 2 - Xt-2]
= -a[x;"_1 - xt-d - ,8[Ax;"_1 - Axt- I ]
where a = (A.I - A.2), ,8 = A.2.
Equation 2 is similar but uses M2 as the target.
* - (2) AR, = -ex[X,_I - V2l-1 - m2l-1]
_ 15
where V2, L(xH - m2H )/16.
IeO
In order to provide a standard of comparison, we also
examine arule in which abase instrumentisused toreach a
nominal income target. 5
(3) Sb, = [AY( + Ap,*] - A WJ,
+ ex[X'~1 - xl-i] + 13 [AX'~I - AX,_I] ,
The left hand sides of these equations represent the
change in the policy instrument, either the annualized
growth rate of the monetary base or the percentage point
change in the short-term interest rate. Since in steady state
the rate of interest is constant, the left hand sides of (1)and
(2) are zero in equilibrium. Hence, the interest rate rules
contain only a feedback component, which specifies how
the interest rate is adjusted when the target variable (nomi-
nal GOP or M2) diverges from thepath (inlevelsorgrowth
rates) desired in the previous quarter. In (2), the target level
of M2 (in logarithms) is defined as the target level of
nominal income less the average level of M2 velocity over
the past 16quarters. The terms a and,8 define the propor-
tions of a target "miss" (in levels and growth rates,
respectively) to which the central bank chooses to respond
in each quarter. In equilibrium, there are no misses and
hence the interest rate is constant.
The monetary base rule is more complicated. The first
SIn our earlier paper (Judd and Motley 1991), we also tested the
followingtwo rules:
t:.b, = [t:.y( + t:.p,.] - t:.VB,
+ a[(yf-\ - y,_\) + (t:.p,:\ - t:.Pt-\)].
The price level target produced instability in the Keynesian model,
while the second rule, suggested by Taylor(1985),produced dynamic
instability in the vector autoregression.
Economic Review I 1992, Number 3term on the right-hand side of (3) represents the growth
rate of nominal GDP that the central bank wishes to
accommodatein thelong-run, which is equal to thesum of
the desired inflation rate (Llp*) and the steady-state growth
rate of real GDP (Llyf). The second term, LlVB, subtracts
the growth rate of base velocity over the previous four
years, and is designed to capture long-run trends in the
relationof base growth tonominal GDP growth. 6 Thethird
term specifies the feedback rule determining how growth
in the base is adjusted when there is a target miss in the
previous quarter. In steady state, this feedback term drops
out, so that the rule simply states that Llb, = Lly{ + Llp1-
LlVB,.
In all three rules, we use two lags on the levels of the
intermediate target variables. As shown in (1),this specifi-
cation is equivalent to including one lag on the leveland
one lag on the growth rate of the target variable (Me-
Callum, 1988b). Thus the instrument is subject to both
"proportional" (response to levels) and "derivative" (re-
sponse to growth rates) feedback. The addition of deriva-
tive feedback can improve theperformance of proportional
feedback rules in some circumstances (Phillips 1954). In
any event, we evaluate the performance of the rules under
all three possible categories of control: proportional only
(a>O, {3 = 0), derivative only (a = 0, {3>0), and both pro-
portional and derivative (a>O, {3>0).
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
For each of the rules tested, we performed a number of
dynamic simulations within the context of two types
of model: a simple structural model based on Keynesian
theory, and a theoretically agnostic vector autoregression
or error correction model.
The models are described in detail in Appendix A. The
Keynesian model embodies fourequations,each represent-
ing a basic building blockof this framework. First, there is
an aggregate demand equation, relating growth in real
GDPto growthinreal M2 balances (orthe monetary base).
Second, there is a Phillips-curve equation, relating infla-
tion to the GDP "gap" (i.e., the difference between real
GDP and an estimate of its full employment level), and a
distributedlag ofpast inflation. This latter variablereflects
the basic Keynesian view that prices are "sticky," and
means that there are long lags from policy actions to price
changes. Third, full-employment real GDP (in levels) is
assumed to have a deterministic trend. Thus the supply of
6The 16-quarter average was designed to be long enough to avoid
dependence on cyclical conditions. As a consequence,thetermcan take
account of possible changes in velocity resulting from regulatory and
technological sources.
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real GDP in levelsis unaffected by business cycle develop-
ments. Finally,the model includes an equation defining the
demand for (real) money (or the monetary base) as a
function of real GDP, and the nominal interestrate.
To simulate this model with a base instrument, this last
equation is replaced by the equation describing the policy
rule (3). In simulations with an interestrate instrument, (1)
and (2), the policy rule determines the interest rate, which
feeds into the M2 or base demand equation to determine
the monetary aggregate. Under both instruments, the sim-
ulation model includes the aggregate demand and supply
equations and the Phillips curve to determine y, yfand p.
In addition to the Keynesianmodel, wealso use either a
vector autoregression (VAR) or a vector error correction
(VECM) framework. Tosimulate the effects of a rule with
a base instrument, we use a four-variable VAR system,
including real GDP, the GDP deflator, the monetary base,
and the three-month Treasury bill rate. In these simula-
tions, the estimatedequation forthe base is replaced bythe
policy rule (3). For the interest rate rules, we use a some-
what different system of equations. Since the second in-
terest rate rule (2) involves M2 as the intermediate target,
we replace the base with M2 in the abovelist of variables.
We use this same system to simulate the effects of (1),
which uses nominal GDP as the intermediate target. In
simulating theinterest rate rules, the estimated interest rate
equation is replaced by the appropriate policy rule.
In estimatingthese systems, weused standard statistical
techniques as described in Appendix A to test for sta-
tionarity, cointegration, and lag length. In the system that
includes M2, we found one cointegrating relationship,
which we interpret as an M2 demand function. This co-
integrating vector was imposed in estimating the resulting
VECM. No cointegrating vector was found in the system
that includes the monetary base, and hencethis system was
estimated as a VAR.
The simulation results fall into three categories. First,
we examine the dynamic stability of each macroeconomic
model when the rules are used to define monetary policy.
Fora policy rule to be considered, it must produce amodel
that has sensible steady state properties. In the long run, a
feedback rule will make the price level follow the desired
path, as long as it does not make the economydynamically
unstable and induce explosive paths for the endogenous
variables. Given the uncertainty about the true structure of
theeconomy,arule must produce dynamic stability in both
types of models examined, and with a range of alternative
values of a and {3, in order to be considered reliable.
We conduct numerous simulations to see if the rules meet
this test.
Second, we conduct repeated stochastic counterfactual
simulations of the alternative models and rules over the
71960-1989 sample period to see how the principal macro-
economic variables might have evolved if the rules had
been followed. In these simulations, we assume that the
shocks in each equationhave the same variance as the esti-
mationerrors. This procedure allows us to constructprob-
ability distributions of alternative outcomes for each rule
and each model, and to calculate (95 percent) confidence
intervals forlong-runinflationrates as well as for short-run
real GDP growth rates and for interest rate changes. This
enables us to compare different rules in terms of the full
range of alternative outcomes that each might produce.
To compare the simulated results under the rules with
the results of the policies actually pursued, we report the
means and 95 percent confidence bands of the actual data
over 1960-1989.
Third, we tested the robustness of these results by
repeating many of the above simulations under alternative
values of key parameters in our estimated models.
Dynamic Stability
The results ofour analysis ofthe dynamic stabilityof the
models under the various rules are shown in Table 1. To
detect whether a particular combination of model, rule,
and pairofa and{3 wasdynamically stable, we computeda
nonstochastic simulation covering 300 quarters. The size
of the simulation's last cycle for the price level (peak-to-
trough change) was divided by the size of its first cycle to
form a ratio that we call s. If s is greater than 1.0, the
simulation is unstable since the swings in the endogenous
variable become larger as time passes, while a value of s
less than 1.0 shows dynamic stability.7 For each combina-
tion of model and rule, we performed a grid search over
various combinations of a (to measure proportional con-
trol) and {3 (to measure derivative control). The grid
extended from a = {3 = 0.0 to a = 0.8 and {3 = 1.1 (in
units of 0.1 for both a and {3). Excluding the combination
in whicha = {3 = 0.0, which represents the no-rule case,
each grid search generated 107 values of s. Although the
exact specification of these searches is somewhat arbitrary,
they do appearto presentan accuratepictureof the stability
properties being investigated.
Table 1 provides a count of stable simulations for each
rule undereach model. As shown, the nominal GDP/base
rule is dynamically stable in every simulation for both
models. Thus the conclusion that an economy guided by a
nominal GDP/base rule would have desirable steady state
properties is quite robust across models and choices of a
and {3. In fact, in the case of a base instrument, the simple
approach of proportional control (only) would seem to
"Nearly all of the simulations we observed exhibited cycles. However,
the method used for detecting dynamic instability also works for
simulations that do not exhibit cycles.
Table 1
Dynamically Stable Simulations byType of Control
Rule Proportional Proportional and Derivative Total
Only Derivative Only
Intermediate'Iarget/Instrument (10 trials) (89 trials) (8 trials) (107 trials)
Nominal GDP/Interest Rate
Keynesian Model 6 68 7 81
VECM 1 13 7 21
M2/Interest Rate
Keynesian Model 8 82 8 98
VECM 0 11 8 19
Nominal GDP/Monetary Base
Keynesian Model 10 89 8 107
VAR 10 89 8 107





a> 0; f3 = 0
a> 0; f3 > 0
a = 0; f3 > 0
Economic Review / 1992, Number 3make sense. In any event, the risk of inducing unstable
cycles by using this rule appears to be small.
The same cannot be said forthe interest rate instrument,
using either nominal GDP or M2 as the intermediate
target. Under the vector error correction model, the rule
produces only 21 stable cases out of 107 trials when
nominal GDPis the intermediatetarget, and only 19stable
cases when M2 is used. The results areconsiderably better
in the Keynesian model (81 and 98 stable trials, respec-
tively, for nominal GDP and M2 targets). However, the
important characteristic of robustness across alternative
models is lacking when the full range of combinations of
proportional and derivative control is considered.
It is not entirely surprising that there is a tendency for
the models to produce more cases of dynamic instabil-
ity when an interest rate instrument is used than when the
base is used. As noted above, economic theory predicts
that the price level would be determinate in the long run
and the economy dynamically stable if the monetary au-
thority were to pegthe base, but that the price levelwould
be indeterminate and the economydynamically unstable if
the authority were to peg a nominal interest rate at a
constant level. Although the feedback rules attempt to
avoid this problem by tying interest rate changes to inter-
mediate targets for nominal variables, the underlying ten-
dency toward instability shows through in our results.
However, in the case of an interest rate rule that exerts
derivative control only-so that policy responds only to
the growth rates, and not the levels, of nominal GDP and
M2-there does not appear to be a problem with in-
stability. As Table1shows, themodel is dynamicallystable
in all 8 trials when the intermediate target is M2, and in
almost all trials (7 out of 8) when nominal GDP is the
target.
CounterfactualSimulations
In this section we present the results of simulations that
attempt to assess how the macroeconomy might have
evolved over the past three decades if the various feedback
rules had been in use. In these "counterfactual experi-
ments," the targeted values of the intermediate target
variables were set underthe assumption that the Fed's goal
was to hold the price level constant over 1960-1989. We
chose values for a and f3 that produced stable simulations
across the two models. For each combination of rule and
model, we calculated 500 stochastic simulations." The
8There are nine alternative rules (i.e., three combinations of interme-
diate targets and instruments, and three combinations of a and 13) and
two models. Thus eighteen sets of 500 stochastic simulations were
computed.
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random shocks in each equation were drawn from proba-
bility distributions that had the same mean and variance as
the estimation error terms. Each set of 500 simulations is
called an experiment.
In presenting the results of these experiments, we focus
on two measures of economic performance that should re-
flectthe concerns of policymakers-theprice leveland the
short-run growth rate of real GDP. Ideally, a policy rule
should deliver price stability withoutcausing unacceptable
fluctuations in real GDP growth. To address possible
concerns about the short-run variability of the interest
rate under the rules, we also examine quarter to quarter
changes in the interest rate instrument.
We measure the price level performance of each rule in
terms of the average inflation rate that it produced over the
30-year simulation period. The volatility of real GDP is
measured in terms of the four-quarter growth rate of real
GDP. Foreach experiment, wecalculated95 percent confi-
dence intervals forboth ofthese variables. In thecase ofthe
simulations using the interest rate instrument, we also
calculated95 percentconfidence intervals for the quarterly
changes in the interest rate.
Table 2 shows the performance of the various rules in
stabilizing the price level.? Using the monetary base as the
instrument, adoption of the norninal-GDP feedback rule
could have stabilized prices in the long run within narrow
limits. For example, under the base rule with both propor-
tional and derivative control (a = 0.25 and f3 = 0.50),
average inflation (with 95 percent probability) would have
been between - 0.4 and + 0.3 percent in the Keynesian
model and between -0.8 and +0.7 percent in the VAR.
Under the policies actually followed during this period,
average inflation was 5.4 percent.
The rules in which the interest rate is used as the
instrument also are able to produce confidence bands that
generally are centered near an average inflation rate of
zero. However,these bands are widerthan when the mone-
tary base is used as the instrument. For example, under the
interest rate instrument (with either proportional control
alone or both derivative and proportional control), the
width of the confidence bands ranges from 1.1 to 4.2
percentagepoints comparedwith bandwidths of0.7to 1.5
percentage points when the base is the instrument. Thus
although both instruments produce confidence bands for
average inflation that are centered on zero, use of the base
as the policy instrument reduces price level uncertainty
more than use of the interest rate.
9Theaverageinflation results in Table 2 are not qualitatively changed if
alternative horizons, such as five, ten or twenty years, are used for the
stochastic simulations.
9Table·2
Simulated Average Annual Inflation Rate 1960-1989
Rule 95% Confidence Limit
Intermediate Thrget/Instrument Proportional Only Proportional and Derivative Only
Derivative
NominalGDP/Interest Rate (0: = 0.75, f3 = 0.00) (0: = 0.25, f3 = 0.50) (0: = 0.00, f3 = 0.50)
KeynesianModel -0.6% to 0.5% - 1.3% to 0.9% -2.3% to 4.9%
VECM Explosive - 1.0% to 2.5% -0.3% to 3.1%
M2/Interest Rate (0: = 0.75, f3 = 0.00) (0: = 0.60, f3 = 0.25) (0: = 0.00, f3 = 0.50)
KeynesianModel -0.8% to 1.0% -0.9% to 1.0% -1.5% to 3.2%
VECM Explosive -1.2% to 3.0% -0.2% to 3.5%
Nominal GDP/Monetary Base (0: = 0.50, f3 =0.00) (0: = 0.25, f3 =0.50) (0: = 0.00, f3 = 0.50)
KeynesianModel - 0.4% to 0.3% -0.4% to 0.3% -0.2% to 0.7%
VAR -0.8% to 0.7% -0.8% to 0.7% -0.5% to 1.0%
Actual Data: 5.4%
The confidence bands on average inflation are consider-
ably wider under the interest rate rules ifpolicy exerts only
derivative control (see the right-hand column of Table 2).
When policy attempts to control onlythegrowthrateofthe
intermediate target, misses in the level in effect are "for-
given" each quarter. Not surprisingly, the widths of the
resulting confidencebands on long-runinflationincrease to
between 3.4 and 7.2 percentage points. However, it is
important to note that even at the top ends of these
confidence bands, average inflation is below the actual
inflation rate over 1960-1989.
Finally, the results suggest that there is little to distin-
guish the nominal GDP target from the M2 target under an
interest rate instrument. However, our use ofa sample
period that ends in 1989 abstracts from the widely dis-
cussed problems with instability in the demand for M2
that have occurred in 1990-1992 (Furlong and Judd 1991,
Judd and Trehan 1992).Since 1989, the velocityofM2has
been roughly constant, whereas historical relationships
suggest that it should have declined rather sharply in
response to declining nominal interest rates. This apparent
shiftinM2 demand raises concerns thatthefuture perform-
ance of M2 as an intermediate target may be worse than it
was in the past.
Table 3 shows the effects of the rules on the volatility of
real GDP. Foreach model, itreports 95 percent confidence
intervals for four-quarter growth rates of real GDP under
10
the alternative rules. 10 The table compares the simulation
results with the distribution of the actual historical data,
which is a measure ofthe volatility of real GDP during the
sample period under the discretionary policies actually
followed by the Federal Reserve.
In nearly every case, the confidence bands are wider
under the rules that use some proportional control (either
alone or in combination with derivative control) than they
were in the actual sample period, though in some cases the
differences are small. For example, in the Keynesian
model, use of the nominal GDP/base rule with both
proportional and derivative control is estimated (with 95
percent confidence) to yield four-quarter real GDP growth
rates of between - 4.0 and +10.3percent, which is wider
than the - 1.9 to +7.9 percent band in the historical data.
In the VAR, thecorresponding confidenceinterval is +0.4
to +9.3 percent, which has about the same width as the
historical measure.
Table 3 suggests that use of an interest rate instrument,
with at least some proportional control, would lead to
larger fluctuations in real GDP growth than a base instru-
ment. The confidence bands are substantially wider under
rules that use an interest rate instrument than with a base
lOWe also looked at the volatilityof the two-quarter and eight-quarter
growth rates of real GDP.The conclusionswerequalitativelythe same
as for the four-quartergrowth measures.
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Simulated Four-Quarter Real GOP Growth Rates
Rule 95% ConfidenceLimit
Intermediate Thrget/Instrument Proportional Only Proportional and Derivative Only
Derivative
NominalGDP/InterestRate (a = 0.75, (3 = 0.00) (a = 0.25, (3 = 0.50) (a = 0.00, (3 = 0.50)
Keynesian Model -16.7% to20.6% -6.3% to 19.7% -1.3% to 8.2%
VECM Explosive -11.7% to 19.8% -0.6% to 10.2%
M2/Interest Rate (a = 0.75, (3 = 0.00) (a = 0.60, (3 = 0.25) (a = 0.00, (3 = 0.50)
Keynesian Model ~7.2% to 13.6% -4.7% to 10.6% -1.6% to 8.3%
VECM Explosive -16.4% to 15.3% 0.8% to 10.0%
NominalGDP/Monetary Base (a = 0.50, (3 = 0.00) (a = 0.25, (3 =0.50) (a = 0.00, (3 = 0.50)
Keynesian Model -3.4% to 10.0% -4.0% to 10.3% -3.5% to 10.2%
VAR -0.4% to 9.9% 0.4% to 9.3% 0.6% to 9.0%
ActualData: -1.9% to 7.9%
instrument, especially in the VAR and VECM models.
There appears to be a slight tendency for the confidence
bands to be narrower under an M2 rule than a nominal
GDP rule, but the difference is small.
However,ifonly derivative control is exerted, thewidth
of the confidence bands on real GDP growth is noticeably
narrower than when there also is a significant element of
proportionalcontrol (see the right hand column ofTable3).
In most cases, derivative control leaves the volatility of
GDP at about the same level as it was historically. This is
true whether an interest rate or a monetary base instrument
is used.
In Table4, wepresent evidence onthequarter-to-quarter
volatility of the short-term interest rate that might result
from following thetwo rules that use theinterest rate as the
instrument. When at least some proportional control is
used, the rules result in an increase in short-run interest
rate volatility compared with that experienced under the
discretionary policy pursued in our sample period. Thus
the width ofthe 95percentconfidence intervalsvariesfrom
5.2 to 16.9 percentage points under the rules, compared
with a width of4.0 percentage points in the actual data.
However, use of derivative control only is estimated to
reduce interest rate volatility compared with history. As
shown in the right-hand column, the confidence bands
range in width from 1.3 to 2.4 percentage points compared
with the 4 point width in the actual data.
Federal Reserve Bank of San.Francisco
In summarizing the results in Tables 2, 3, and 4, it is
useful to compare the simulations under an interest rate in-
strument both with those under a base instrumentand with
the historical record. Compared to the base-instrument
results, we conclude:
1. Use ofthe interest rate permits much more long-run drift
in the price level than use of the base.
2. An interest rate instrument also results in more volatility
ofreal GDP,except inthecase ofderivativecontrol only,
when the interest rate instrument leads to less volatility.
Comparing the results under an interest rate instrument
with historical experience, we can make the following
generalizations:
1.Ifat least some proportional control is used, the interest
rate rule would hold inflation well below its historical
average, but would result in greater volatility in real
GDP and interest rates than experienced in the past.
2. If derivative control only is used, then the interest rate
rules would hold inflation somewhat below historical
experience, maintain real GDP volatility at about its
historical level, and result in less interest rate volatility
than actually occurred in the past.
11Table 4












(a = 0.75, f3 =0.00)
- 8.3% to 8.6%
Explosive






(a = 0.25, f3 = 0.50)
-3.7% to 3.8%
-2.5% to 2.7%
(a = 0.60, f3 = 0.25)
- 3.0% to 3.0%
-3.5% to 3.7%
- 2.0% to 2.0%
Derivative Only
(a = 0.00, f3 = 0.50)
-1.1% to 1.3%
-0.9% to 1.1%




One problem with attempting to evaluateempirically the
likely effects ofmonetary policy'rules that were not actu-
ally followed during the periodfor which data are available
is that the estimated behavioral parameters of models
mighthavebeendifferent ifthe rule had actually been used
(Lucas 1973).In a crude attempt to deal with this issue, we
haverecalculated many of the simulations discussed above
underalternative assumptions about keycoefficients in our
estimated models. We ran these simulations under the
assumption that selected coefficients varied (one at a time)
from their estimated levelsbyplus and minus two standard
deviations. The results of these alternative simulations are
shown in Appendix B.
The coefficients that were varied in these tests included
the following:
1. In the Keynesian model, we altered the slope of the
Phillips curve, the elasticities of real GDP with respect
to both real M2 and the real base in the aggregate de-
mand equations, and the interest elasticities of the
demand forboth M2 and thebase. In addition, wevaried
the length of the lags on past inflation in the Phillips
curve, restricted the sum of these coefficients on past
inflation to unity, and introduced a unit root in potential
GDP.
2. In the VECM, wevaried the interestrate, GDP and price
elasticitiesofM2 in the cointegratingvectorthat appears
in the M2 and price equations.
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There are too many results in Appendix B to review in
detail. However,several general points stand out. First, the
results for average inflation are quite robust for all of
the rules within all of the models. When the monetary base
is the instrument, the results for real GDP growth also are
robust, although somewhat less so than for inflation.
As shown in Tables B.2 and B.4, the width of the
confidence bands for four-quarter real GDP growth is
relatively sensitive to coefficient variations when the inter-
est rate is used as the instrumentand therule involvessome
proportional control. In a few cases the bands become
somewhat narrower, but in many more they become con-
siderably wider. On the other hand, interest rate volatility
is relatively less sensitive to the changes in the models'
coefficients. However, as shown in Tables B.3 and B.5,
when the interestrate rule involves derivative control only,
the simulation results are highly robust.
One issue of special concern is the restriction in the
Phillips curve that the coefficients on lagged inflation sum
to unity (point 2 in TablesB.1, B.2, and B.3). This restric-
tion ensures that monetary policy is neutral with respect to
real GDP in the long run (i.e., it makes the Phillips curve
"vertical" in the long run), and is a central feature of the
theory underlying the Phillips curve. Although the restric-
tion is rejected by the data in our sample (see the F test
underequationA.2' in theAppendix), weimposeditin our
sensitivity analysis because of its theoretical importance.
In most cases, the imposition of this restriction leads to
dynamic instability.
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In this paper, we have examined the effectiveness of
nominalfeedback rules that link short-run monetary policy
actions to an intermediate target with the ultimate goal of
controlling inflation in the long-run. Twosubsidiary goals
are that the rules not induce unacceptably large variations
in real GDP or in interest rates. Given uncertainties about
the structure of the economy, these rules are designed to be
model-free in the sense that the monetary authority does
not needtorely ona specificmodel oftheeconomyinorder
to implement them. In addition, therules are operational in
that they define specific movements in an instrument that
can be controlled precisely by the central bank.
We have focused mainly on rules that use a short-term
interest rate as the policy instrument, and either nominal
GDP or M2 as the intermediate target. As a standard of
comparison, we also have looked at a rule in which
the monetary base is the instrument and nominal GDP
is the intermediatetarget. This rule has been showntohave
desirable properties in earlier research. In addition, we
compare the results from the rules with actual experience
over the past three decades.
Our empirical results suggest that all of the feedback
rules examined, so long as they do not produce explosive
paths, wouldbe highly likelyto hold inflationbelowtheav-
erage rate experienced in the U.S. over 1960-1989. When
comparing rules with alternative instruments, the interest
rate rule does not measure up to rules with the monetary
base as the instrument and nominal GDP as the intermedi-
ate target. The latter rule provides much tighter control of
the price level and induces somewhat less volatility in real
GDP than rules using an interest rate as the instrument.
Moreover, rules using the base as the instrument are
consistent with dynamic stability in the economy under a
wide range of assumptions, whereas the same cannot be
saidforrules with interest rate instruments. In a numberof
cases, the latter rules induced explosive paths in the
economies simulated.
Despitethe strong results obtained for rules with a base
instrument, there are reasons to be concerned that their
performance in the future would not measure up to the
results obtained inour counterfactual simulations covering
the past three decades. One importantconsideration isthat
the increase in foreign demand for U.S. currency in recent
years may have made the overall demand function less
stable than in the past.
So whatconclusions can bereached about theeffective- ,
ness of rules defined in terms of an interest rate instru-
ment?First, within such rules, nominal GDP and M2were
found overour 1960-1989 sample period to function about
equally wellas intermediate targets. Given this result, and
FederalReserve Bank of San Francisco
the evidence that the relationship between M2 and spend-
ing may have broken down during 1990-1992, rules de-
fined in terms of nominal GDP would appear to be less
risky.
Second, based upon our simulations, interest rate rules
that involve someproportional control of nominal GDP (or
M2) do not appear to be viable alternatives for monetary
policy. We found a large number of cases in which these
rules produced explosivepaths for the simulated economy.
Thus use of such a rule in the real world, where we do not
know with any precision the structure and size of param-
eters of the pertinentbehavioral relationships, wouldrun a
significant risk of inducing dynamic instability.
However,feedback rules with an interest rate instrument
that focus on the growth rate, rather than the level, of
nominal GDP (or M2) lead to dynamic stability in the
various models. Naturally, such rules automatically ac-
commodate past misses of the level of the intermediate
target,and thus allow the possibility that the price level
may drift over time. Such drift would occur only when
there were a prolonged series of positive or negative
shocks. However,it should be noted that even after allow-
ing for such drift, the worst case simulation that we
obtained still held the simulated averageinflationrate over
1960-1989below thehistorical average.Moreover,such an
approach is estimated with a very high probability to
involveabout the same levelof volatility in real GDP and a
reduction in interest rate volatility compared with histor-
ical experience.
This conclusion suggests that, although arule thataimed
at controlling the growth rate of nominal GDP with an in-
terest rate instrument is far from ideal, it might be an
improvement over a purely discretionary interest rate pol-
icy.Itwould seem to offer the likelihood of lowerlong-run
inflation without increasing the volatility of real GDP or
interest rates. A simple version of such a rule can be
written!'
~Rt = -0.50[~xi_l - ~Xt-d·
Such arule could make acontribution topolicy,evenif it
were used only to modify the Fed's traditional discretion-
ary approach. When using an interest rate instrument
within the context of a purely discretionary policy, it is
natural for the policymaker to evaluate alternative policy
actions relative to a status quo policy ofleavingtheinterest
rate (currently the federal funds rate) unchanged. As a
11Asnotedabove, At referstoachangeinthelogofnominalGDP,while








result, the debate tends to focus on a decision about
whether the funds rate should be raised or lowered from its
recent level. This approach may be misleading, since a
policy of leaving the funds rate unchanged does not neces-
sarily imply that the future thrust of policy relative to key
macroeconomic variables will remain unchanged.
However, the instrument setting given by the feedback
rule at any point in time does provide a sensible way to
define no change in monetary policy, since it represents a
consistent policy regime, incorporating the long-run goal,
the intermediate-runtarget and theshort-runinstrument. A
debate that focused upon whether policy should ease,
tighten, or remain the same relative to what thefeedback
rule calls for, would seem to be more informed than one
that focused upon whether the short-term interest rate
should be changed from recent levels. Occasional adjust-
ments to the nominal GDP target could be used to offset
drift in the price level that may arise from exercising
derivative control (only) of nominal GDP.12
The approachoutlinedabove could be consideredas one
possible step to improve apurely discretionary interestrate
policy. In effect, the rule would be used to provide policy-
makers with information that could help them make short-
run discretionary decisions without losing sight of the
long-run goal of controlling inflation.
121f, for example, the levelof prices were to drift significantly upward or
downward despite following the rule, an offsetting adjustment could be
made to the path of the nominal GDP target. Of course, the central bank
would have to guard against the temptation to make frequent adjust-
ments to the target path, since this could undermine the value of the
feedback rule. One way to do this would be to define in advance the
amount of drift in the price level that would be tolerated before a level




We employed two alternative sets of assumptions about
the structure of the economy: a Keynesian model and a
vector autoregression (VAR) or vector error correction
model (VECM). As will become apparent, the models are
not attempts to describe the structure of the economy as
precisely as possible. Rather, the Keynesian model incor-
porates the fundamental features of this macroeconomic
paradigm. The VAR/VECM systemis an atheoretic model
that captures the statistical relations among various mac-
roeconomic time series. These models are meant to illus-
trate the basic nature ofthe responses of the economyto the
implementation of the monetary policy rules tested.
All of the equations below are estimatedover 1960.Qlto
1989.Q4. The variables in the regressions below are de-
fined as follows:
b = log ofmonetary base
(adjusted for reserve requirement changes)
cc 1 in 1980.Q2, and 0 elsewhere
g log of government purchases
m2 = log ofM2
mm = 1 in 1983.Ql and 0 elsewhere
p log of GDP deflator
R 3-month treasury bill rate
T = time trend
x log of nominal GDP
yf log of real GDP trend (see equation A.3)
y = log of real GDP
Keynesian Model
The Keynesian, or "sticky price" model, consists of
four equations. First, the real aggregate demand equation
embodies the direct effects ofmonetaryand fiscal policy on
macroeconomic activity. In one version, it specifies the
growth rate of real GDP as a function of currentand lagged
growth rates of the real monetary base, real government
spending, and its own lagged values:
(A.l) ~YI = 0.0045 + 0.17~Yt-I + 0.47(~bt-l - ~PI-1)
(4.45) (2.06) (4.41)






Economic Review / 1992, Number 3An alternative version uses M2 as the monetary policy
variable:














Equation (A.3) defines yf, the log of full-employment
real GDP, as the fitted values of a log linear time trend (n
of real GDP. This equation incorporates the idea, common
to Keynesian models, that real GDP is trend stationary.






+ 0,41(Lim2/_ 1 - Lip/_I)
(5.09)







The supply side oftheKeynesianmodelisasimplifiedPhil-
lips curve, which embodies the essential "sticky price"
characteristic of the paradigm. Itspecifies that the current
inflation rate depends onpast inflationandthegapbetween
actual and full-employment real GDP (y - yf). Theory
suggests that the coefficients on lagged inflation shouldbe
constrainedto sum to 1,thus ensuring that, in steady state,
real GDP will be equal to its full-employment level, and
inflation willbeconstant. However, thedataoverthesample
period used reject this restriction at the 3.3 percent margi-
nal significance level.Our basicmodeldoesnotincorporate
this restriction, but we also show results in which it is
imposed (equation A.2').




















To test for the robustness of the results under a unit root
in real GDP, we also estimate the following equation:
(A.3') Liy, = 0.0051 + 0.24LiYH + 0.014LiY,_2
(4.00) (2.56) (1.50)
Equations (A.4) and (A.5) represent the financial sector
of the model, respectively defining the demands for the
monetary base and M2 as functions of the aggregate price
index, real GDP and a short-termnominal interest rate. As
in Miller (1991), we findthat M2 is cointegratedwith these
arguments, whereas the base is not. Thus the base demand
equation is specified in first differences, while the M2
demand equation has an error correction form.
(A.4) Lib/-Lip/ = 0.00029 + O.064LiY/_1 + 0.17LiY,_2
(0.42) (1.15) (3.40)
+ 0.33Lip,_2 + 0.28Lip,_3 + 0.07Lip,_4
(3.51) (2.98) (0.86)














RESTRICTION: In L OJ Lip/_i' L 0i - 1.
i=1 i=1
F(I,113) = 4.63.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 15(A.5) t.lm2t = -0.079 - 0.89m2t-1 + 0.89Pt_l
(-2.49) (-3.27) (3.27)
+ 0.95Yt_l - 0.14Rt_1 + 0.70t.lm2t-l
(3.27) (-3.71) (11.28)
+ 0.17t.lpt - 0.074t.lYt - 0.26t.lRt
(1.93) (-1.42) (-4.56)






The above equations were combined with the various
feedback rules to form three simulation models that were
used to generate results discussed in the text:
Nominal GDPllnterestRate Simulation: Equation 1, with
equationsA.1, A.2, A.3, andA.4.
M21InterestRate Simulation: Equation 2, with equations
A.I: A.2, A.3, and A.5.
Nominal GDPIMonetary Base Simulation: Equation 3,
with equations A.I, A.2, and A.3.
Vector Autoregression-Error Correction Models
In addition to the model just discussed, we also con-
ducted simulations using an atheoretic framework. For the
case in which the monetary base is used as the instrument,
we used the following variables: real GDP, the price level,
the base and the nominal short-term interest rate. Follow-
ing Johansen and Juselius (1990) we tested for cointegrat-
ing vectors in this system of variables. Finding none, we
estimated a VARwith all variables in first differences. We
selected lag lengths using the Final Prediction Error pro-
cedure (Judge, et al., 1985). The estimation results are
summarized in Table A.I.
The VARembodies notheoretical restrictions andthere-
fore is agnostic about the structure of the economy. In
simulating this model with the nominal GDP/Base rule,
the estimated equation for the base was replaced by equa-
tion (3) defining the policy rule. This produced:
Nominal GDPIMonetary Base Simulation: Equation 1,
together with the VAR equationsfor y,p, and R.
Toevaluate the rules in equations 1and 2, which use the
interestrate as the instrument, we incorporated the follow-
ing variables: real GDP, the price level,M2, and the
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Table A.1
Marginal Significance Levels of
Dependent Variables
l1y I1p I1R I1b
l1y .509 .000332
I1p .018 .000 .168
I1R .00192 .0152 .898 .000
I1b .666 .0366 .000
R2 0.36 0.71 .039 .063
SEE 0.0080 0.0036 .0077 0.0035
Q 26.55 26.60 43.18 27.85
D.F. 101 109 102 110
Table A.2
Vector Error Correction Model
DependentVariables










l1y .585851 .332590 .237394 .003320
I1p .004468 .000000 .225075 .168222
11m2 .037828 .585279 .000000
I1R .063848 .004459 .000037 .898220
R2 0.31 0.69 0.66 0.32
SEE 0.0078 0.0036 0.0046 0.0077
Q 34.13 17.44 28.60 43.18
D.F. 95 103 97 102
aRestrictionof coefficient equality imposed.
bLags chosen by Final Prediction Error procedure (Judge, et al.,
1985).
Economic Review I 1992, Number 3treasury bill rate. In this case, the Johansen-Juselius tests
detected one cointegrating vector, which was statistically
significant in the M2 and price equations. Given the signs
and magnitudes of the coefficients in this vector, it appears
to be a money demand equation. Moreover, the Johansen-
Juse1ius test failed to reject the hypothesis that the coeffi-
cientson y, p and m2 were equal. Theestimationresults are
summarized in Table A.2.
ApPENDIXB
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: 1960-1989
In simulations to evaluate equations I and 2, the interest
rate equation above was replaced by the rule. This yielded:
Nominal GDP/Interest-Rate Simulation: Equation 1, to-
gether with VECM equationsfor y, p, andM2.
M2/Interest-Rate Simulation: Equation 2, together with
VECM equationsfor y, p, andM2.
Table B.1
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- 0.4% to 0.6%
-0.5 to 0.6
- 0.4% to 0.2%
Four-Quarter
Real GDP Growth








- 3.6% to 10.0%
aThis column reports the number of combinations of a and f3 that produced dynamically stable simulations out of a total of 107combinations
tried.
bSimulations use a = 0.50 and f3 = 0.00.
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- 1.3% to 0.9%
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"This column reports the number of combinations of a and f3 that produced dynamically stable simulations out of a total of 107combinations
tried.
bSimulations use a = 0.25 and f3 = 0.50.
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Rule: Nominal GDP/Interest Rate
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-This columnreports the numberof valuesof{3that produceddynamically stablesimulations out of a total of 8 trials.
bSimulations use a = 0.00 and {3 = 0.50.
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Rule: Nominal GDP/Interest Rate






















































-This column reports the numberof combinationsof a and{3 that produceddynamicallystable simulationsout of a total of 107combinations
tried.
bSimulationsuse a = 0.25 and{3= 0.50.
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Rule: Nominal GOP/Interest Rate




























- 8.8% to 12.5%
-5.1 to -2.2
Explosive






















aThis column reports the valuesof {3 that produced dynamicallystable simulationsout of a total of 8 trials.
bSimulations use a = 0.00 and {3 = 0.50.
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